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Introduction 
 
The new agreement between 
the OPEC members and a group of 
non-OPEC countries (so called OPEC+ 
group) that was reached on 12 April 
2020 does not necessarily mean the 
end of the price war. 
Starting from May, the 
participants of the renewed Vienna 
agreement are expected to cut their 
production by 9.7 million barrels a day 
in order to raise and maintain the 
stability of the oil prices. The deal is 
also supposed to end the oil price war 
which started after the failure of the 
previous attempt by the OPEC+1 to 
coordinate the production cuts for April 
and beyond. However, this will not 
happen, at least for now. In mid-April, 
Saudi Arabia surprised market 
observers by the declaration of official 
selling prices (OSP) on its oil for May. 
Initial expectations were that, in May, 
Riyadh would increase them to support 
the common OPEC+ struggle for 
higher oil prices. However, while 
raising the OSPs for the US market 
and keeping them close to the April’s 
low level for Europe, Riyadh further 
                                                            
1 In 2016, the joint efforts of Riyadh and 
Moscow led to the signing of the Vienna 
Agreement between OPEC and non-OPEC 
countries (Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Brunei, 
Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Mexico, Oman, Russia, 
Sudan, Southern Sudan and Equatorial Guinea 
(joined the OPEC in 2017)), which was aimed 
at decreasing oil production to prevent the fall 
of oil prices and ensure their stability. The 
participants of this deal were named OPEC+ 
group.  
downed prices for Asia.2 Moreover, as 
reported by Reuters, Saudi Aramco 
tried to provide its oil consumers with 
options to delay payments for supplies 
for up to 90 days. These moves clearly 
showed that Saudi authorities continue 
their struggle for dominance at the oil 
markets and consider Asia (first of all, 
China) as their top priority in this fight. 
However, this decision by Riyadh 
should have been expected. 
 
Why China? 
  
Saudi Arabia traditionally 
considers Asia and, first of all, China 
as its main consumer market. Riyadh 
has never stopped fighting for it with 
other suppliers to secure Saudi leading 
positions.  Thus, even during the 2015-
19 "honeymoon" in Russia-Saudi 
relations, Riyadh positioned Moscow 
as its main rival in the Chinese market, 
occasionally entering into an active 
struggle for consumers in different 
regions of the PRC (for example, in the 
Dalian region). In 2019, Saudi Arabia 
was even able to push Russia from the 
first place in the list of oil exporters to 
this Asian country that Moscow had 
occupied for several years in a row. 
Today, the Saudi struggle for 
the Chinese market is determined by a 
serious economic necessity. The 
current fight for oil markets is different 
from what Saudi Arabia has 
experienced before. Previously, its 
rivalry with other suppliers was to a 
certain extent indirect: in most cases, it 
                                                            
2 It is notable that the discounts provided by 
Saudi Aramco for Asian consumers in April 
had already been unprecedented. 
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has never led to the decrease in the 
physical oil supplies to China by any of 
the players. Thus, in 2015-19, Riyadh 
and Moscow were rivaling for the right 
to satisfy new oil demand volumes 
generated by the Chinese economic 
growth or competing for the possibility 
to replace Iran and Venezuela as oil 
suppliers when these countries almost 
completely left the Chinese market 
under the influence of the US 
sanctions. Now, the global supply glut 
aggravated by the unprecedented fall 
in oil consumption makes the Saudis 
fight for existing shares in order to 
ensure that its oil can still be sold. The 
global oil market is not simply 
oversupplied but it is also shrinking. 
The new OPEC+ deal will not 
immediately change the situation: in 
May – June it will be able to take from 
the market only up to 65 per cent of the 
oversupply. For Riyadh, whose 
economy is heavily dependent on oil, 
the preservation of the market share is 
a matter of life and death. The situation 
is also aggravated by the domestic fall 
in Saudi oil consumption and limited 
available storage reserves. If Saudi 
Arabia fails to find consumers for its oil, 
this might not only lead to the fall in the 
exports incomes, but also to the 
physical decrease in the output when 
the storages are full. China with its 
expected restoration of oil demand 
(which seems to have already started) 
and traditionally higher netbacks is 
naturally drawing Saudi attention. The 
Chinese appeal is getting even 
stronger for the KSA as the prospects 
of European and US recovery from the 
negative impact of COVID-19 remain 
unclear and the US authorities are 
threatening to limit the presence of 
foreigners in the American oil market. 
 
 
Saudi Chances for Victory 
 
The Saudi starting point in this 
struggle is not ideal. Saudi production 
limits under the renewed OPEC+ 
agreement make it impossible for 
Riyadh to affect its positions at the 
global markets using the status of a 
‘swing’ producer. Meanwhile, Saudi 
Arabia is not the only one that keeps 
an eye on the Chinese oil market 
looking for signs of its recovery and 
hoping to find an extra place for its oil. 
West African, Latin American and other 
Gulf oil producers as well as the US 
companies are keen to ensure their 
presence in China. Unprecedentedly 
low oil prices open the Chinese market 
for those oil grades that have 
previously been unheard of selling 
there. Chinese consumers, in turn, 
demonstrate no loyalty to traditional 
suppliers – whether Saudi or Russian – 
giving preference to those who can 
offer better prices.  
It should not also be 
disregarded that in the mid-Jan 2020, 
China and the US signed the so-called 
“phase one” trade deal that implies 
Chinese pledge of multibillion oil and 
petrochemical exports from the United 
States. This pledge can definitely help 
the US in its struggle for the Chinese 
oil market, negatively affecting the 
chances of Saudi Arabia to increase its 
market share in the PRC. 
 
Fighting with the Russian Bear 
 
Russia is not to be forgotten, as 
well. In March 2020, Saudi discounts 
for April reduced the appeal of Russian 
ESPO crude for China. Yet, the 
situation with the Urals crude oil 
actually challenged Saudi interests. 
Traditionally, this grade of the Russian 
oil was exported predominantly to 
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Europe. In March, the price of Urals 
crude fell significantly under the 
negative impact of COVID-19 on fuel 
demand in Europe. As a result, even 
with all high transportation costs 
added, the Urals suddenly became no 
less interesting for Chinese consumers 
than Saudi oil. Subsequently, in March, 
Chinese oil importers signed deals with 
Russian suppliers for a record level of 
Urals’ oil deliveries in April – May 
2020. Apart from that, falling domestic 
fuel demand in Russia caused by the 
COVID-19 and planned maintenance 
work on some of the Russian refineries 
also provided Moscow with additional 
volumes for exports, further bringing 
down the prices on Russian oil. 
Russia’s geographical proximity 
to China remains another important 
factor. It helps Moscow reduce the 
transportation cost of its supplies as 
well as the delivery time. In case of 
Saudi Arabia, the time and cost of 
transportation might be a real 
challenge. In March, Saudi and Emirati 
plans to increase the volume of oil 
exports substantially raised the 
demand for tanker freight and carrier 
services. The increased cost of rent 
reduced the Saudi price advantage 
over Russian oil in April. This problem 
can be partially solved if the Saudi 
Arabia decides to use its oil reserves 
storage in Okinawa to supply China. 
Yet, given the limited volume of these 
reserves, this will be only a temporarily 
solution.  
 
Saudi Fatigue? 
 
The Chinese strategy of 
diversification of hydrocarbon supplies 
may play its role against the Saudi 
interests at the Chinese market. By 
2020, the KSA, indeed, managed to 
significantly increase its share of the 
Chinese market. However, this 
arguably happened by accident: 
Chinese leadership urgently needed a 
supplier to replace Iran, Venezuela or 
the US and it did not have time to 
properly choose among available 
options. This, in turn, required China to 
deepen oil price discounts for Asia in 
May.  
Finally, the 2019 raise in Saudi 
share of Chinese oil imports goes 
against the Beijing principles of 
national energy security which 
encourage further diversification of oil 
suppliers. Consequently, in 2020, 
Beijing will perhaps try to slow down 
the growth of its dependence on Saudi 
Arabia. In this regard, maintaining or 
increasing reliance on non-Gulf 
suppliers appears to be a more likely 
scenario for China. 
 
Riyadh’s Response 
 
This situation has determined 
the Saudi price moves in April. Further 
discounts on May prices for Asia, while 
either raising or maintaining the prices 
for other regions, allowed Riyadh to 
achieve multiple goals at the same 
time. First of all, Saudi Arabia 
compensated for the negative effect 
from the March increase in tanker 
freight cost. Second, the additional 
discounts made the ESPO crude even 
less appealing for the Chinese than it 
was before, and evened Saudi oil odds 
with the Urals crude. It also made 
American and West African offers less 
competitive. Third, higher prices for 
Europe and the United States naturally 
diverted Saudi oil flows from other 
regions of the world to China, handling 
the issue of decrease in Saudi 
production capacities after April. 
Finally, Riyadh also reduced its 
competition with the US producers at 
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the American market. This was not just 
a way to appease Trump who was 
seriously concerned about Saudi 
rivalry with the US oil producers. By 
doing this, the KSA encourages the 
Americans to concentrate on their own 
market first instead of looking at Asia.  
In addition, the Saudis have 
their extra trump cards up their sleeve. 
The low cost of production (both in 
terms of operating and capital costs) 
and wide range of oil grades produced 
in the KSA provide the Kingdom with 
both an access to a significant number 
of consumers and the ability to play 
with the OSPs. Riyadh’s reliance on 
long-term supply contracts and active 
investments in the end-users of its oil 
can ensure a guaranteed market share 
for Saudi hydrocarbons. Thus, in 2018 
– 2019, KSA actively tried to expand its 
presence in the petrochemical sector 
of China, preliminarily agreeing to 
purchase shares in a number of 
refineries in the country. Finally, 
Riyadh is able to use its oil storages to 
react to any raise in Chinese demand 
without any need to immediately 
increase the output. 
All of these make Riyadh not 
only determined but ready to wage a 
war for its share of the Asian market 
and do its best to preserve its position 
until the OPEC+ production restraints 
are eased later this year.  
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